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ABSTRACT
This second part focuses on estimation of secret parameters of some practical watermarking techniques. The
first part reveals some theoretical bounds of information leakage about secret keys from observations. However,
as usual in information theory, nothing has been said about practical algorithms which pirates use in real life
application. Whereas Part One deals with the necessary number of observations to disclose secret keys (see
definitions of security levels), this part focuses on the complexity or the computing power of practical estimators.
Again, we are inspired here by the work of Shannon as in his famous article [15], he has already made a clear cut
between the unicity distance and the work of opponents’ algorithm. Our experimental work also illustrates how
Blind Source Separation (especially Independent Component Analysis) algorithms help the opponent exploiting
this information leakage to disclose the secret carriers in the spread spectrum case. Simulations assess the security
levels theoretically derived in Part One.
Keywords: W atermarking, Security, Blind source separation.
1. ATTACK ALGORITHMS FOR SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED TECHNIQUES
Part one not only gives security levels of the substitutive method, but also contains almost practical implementa-
tions of workable algorithms. On the contrary, it only presents theoretical assessment of security levels for spread
spectrum based techniques. Hence, this section deals with practical algorithms useful to hack these schemes.
For each attack, an algorithm is presented, and tested on synthetic data as supposed by the model of (I-13),
with BPSK symbols and gaussian host vectors. At the end of the section, these algorithms are applied on spread
transform side information methods and one still image technique.
This section has an intensive use of PCA and ICA algorithms, which is completely new in watermarking
security analysis, as the only other papers mentioning PCA/ICA in the watermarking community have different
purposes. [32] and [33] used ICA to design a watermarking embedder. [34] presented a technique for estimating
the watermark by observing only one image. Their purpose is the simple erasure of the whole watermark signal
and not the disclosure of the secret parameters, whereas the approach here allows a complete access to the
watermarking communication channel to remove, read or write hidden data †.
The following average normalized correlation measures the efficiency of our attack:
η =
1
Nc
Nc∑
`=1
uˆT` u`
‖uˆ`‖ . (1)
Although the normalization renders estimators uˆj/‖uˆj‖ biased [36], the normalized correlation is preferred
because it is an extremely popular measure in the watermarking community. η . 1 means that the opponent
discloses vectors almost collinear with the secret carriers. When existing, we manually removed the ambiguity
of the signed permutation. Measures of η are done averaging Nt = 128 experimental results.
∗Author names appear in alphabetical order. Contact Information: teddy.furon@irisa.fr
The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the French Government through the ACI Fabriano, and by the
European Commission through the IST Programme under Contract IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT.
†We discovered after submission a similar approach uniquely devoted to watermark removal and only based on PCA
in [35].
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Figure 1. KMA for DSSS (Nc = 4, Nv = 512). η against log10(No) and WCR in dB. The curve No = Ncσ
2
x/γ
2 is plotted
with small circles.
The relation with the theoretical security levels is not difficult to find out. (1) is in expectation the cosine
of the angle between u` and uˆ` = u` + n, n being the estimation noise (orthogonal to u` and whose norm is√
tr(CRB(Vect(U)))/Nc, with tr(A) the trace of matrix A.) The following relation holds:
η ≈ ‖u`‖√‖u`‖2 + tr(CRB(Vect(U)))/Nc
. (2)
1.1. Known Message Attack
Observing (y,a)No , the opponent can use the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) related to (I-14). This
estimator is also defined by ∂ logL
∂u`
= 0 ∀` ∈ {1, . . . , Nc}. With the following log-likelihood
logL(Y) = const− 1
2σ2x
No∑
j=1
‖~yj − γ√
Nc
U~aj)‖2 , (3)
this gives:
Uˆ =
√
Nc
γ
(YAT )(AAT )−1. (4)
The MLE is known to be unbiased and consistent, i.e. it asymptotically achieves the CRB derived in Part One.
Fig. (1) shows experimental values of η against No and WCR = γ
2/σ2x for the DSSS case. The locus of points
such that η = const are projected on the plane η = 0. They appear to be parallel with the curve No = Ncσ
2
x/γ
2.
Tests done with different Nv confirm that the efficiency of the attack does not depend on the vector length. This
asserts the theoretical security level given Part One.
The complexity of this estimator is quite small. A rough approximation gives an order of O(NvNcNo) for
the matrix multiplications, plus O(Nc
3) for the inversion of AAT , which is extremely easy to do on nowadays
computer for Nc of several hundreds.
1.2. Known Original Attack
In this case, the opponent observes several instances of dj = (yj − xj) ∝ Uaj . As mentioned in Part One, this
is related to the well known problem of signal processing called Blind Source Separation (BSS), with no noise.
A lot of papers have already been written on BSS, and we just recall here its most common algorithms. Note
that spread spectrum corresponds to the BSS over-determined case (i.e., Nv ≥ Nc).
The most classical algorithm in BSS is the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Denote D = Y − X .
This technique makes an eigendecomposition of the matrix DDT = γ2UAATUT /Nc. This corresponds to a
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of vectors dNo . Please, note that ρ
∆
= Rank (A) is also the rank of DDT .
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Figure 2. PCA vs. ICA. PCA finds the secret carriers up to a rotation, whereas ICA succeeds to align the estimated
carriers uˆNc with uNc (Here, Nc = 2). An ambiguity remains in their order (permutation) and orientation (sign).
Hence, the decomposition outputs ρ orthonormal vectors lying in Span (U). In the best case, the opponent has
ρ = min(No, Nc). Nevertheless, in reality, he may have ρ ≤ min(No, Nc) if the No symbol vectors are linearly
dependent.
When successful (i.e., when ρ = Nc), the PCA technique yields a orthonormal basis of the secret subspace
Span (U). The possibilities to hack watermarked pieces of content when Span (U) is disclosed are summarized
in subsection 1.4. Yet, the vectors of this basis are not necessary collinear with the private carriers. This is due
to the unitary matrix P mentioned in subsection 4.4 of Part One. The opponent cannot decode, as projection
of watermarked signals onto this basis gives a mixture of the hidden symbols. This is illustrated by Fig. 2. The
same reason prevents him transmitting information in the hidden channel. Nevertheless, under the assumption
that the symbol vectors are statistically independent, the opponent can resort to a more powerful tool: the
Independent Component Analysis (ICA). It is an extension of PCA, constraining the output estimated symbol
vectors to be independent [25]. Good tutorials on ICA and on its links with BSS are [27, 37]. A very general
ICA algorithm named FastICA [38] has been preferred to algorithms dedicated to specific symbol distribution
as mentioned in Part One [28, 29].
In short, ICA algorithms usually work in the basis recovered by a PCA. This basis describes exactly the
secret subspace (provided that ρ = Nc). The problem is now reduced to the estimation of the Nc×Nc matrix P .
Hence, parameter Nv has absolutely no influence on the attack. Then, in an iterative process, the ICA ‘rotates’
the basis until it nullifies an objective function (often called a constrast function) of the estimated sources or
symbols aˆNo . This function is usually an approximation of the mutual information of the estimated sources. We
have supposed that the symbols are independent random variable, thus their mutual information is null. We
are looking here the matrix P which renders the estimated sources statistically independent, thus which nullify
their mutual information. Contrast functions depend on the distribution of the symbol sources. However, this
measure reflects statistical independence only for large No. For a finite number of observations, ICA algorithms
usually search for a minimum of the contrast function with the help of a gradient descent technique.
When successful, ICA reduces the set of ambiguity matrices P to the one of signed permutations. This is
illustrated by Fig. 2. Subsection 1.4 lists the possibilities to hack watermarked pieces of content when the carriers
are disclosed up to a signed permutation.
1.3. Watermarked Only Attack
The WOA case is quite similar to KOA, as it is related to BSS but in a noisy environment. The covariance
matrix Ry has the following expression:
Ry = Rx + γ
2
Nc
UE{AAT }UT = Rx + γ
2
Nc
URaUT = σ2xI +
γ2σ2a
Nc
UUT . (5)
Its diagonalization leads to Nc eigenvalues equaling σ
2
x+ γ
2σ2a/Nc, and Nv−Nc eigenvalues equaling σ2x. Hence,
the eigenvectors related to the Nc biggest values constitute a basis of Span (U), which is also known as the signal
space in blind equalization for digital communications.
PCA estimates covariance matrix Ry by YYT /No, and outputs Nc eigenvectors whose eigenvalues are the
biggest ones. Due to this rough estimation, these vectors do not live exactly in Span (U). Compared to Fig. 2,
these noisy estimation vectors would not lie in the plan of the page, regarded as subspace Span (U) in this simple
example. However, ICA will still try to rotate them in order to render the decoded symbols independent. Fig. 3
shows the locus of points such that η = const for different values of Nc and No, with the DSSS method (i.e.,
a BPSK modulation). The ICA algorithm meets the theoretical limit only for large No, and high energy of
watermark signal per carrier: γ2Nv/Nc. Note that, for Nc = 4, the gap between experimental performances and
theoretical limit gets larger.
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Figure 3. WOA for DSSS. Operating points achieving η = 0.8 for different parameters Nc and Nv . The solid line is the
theoretical limit for Nc = 1, and curves with stars, circles and triangles are the experimental results. They capture the
efficiency of the PCA, as only one carrier is used. The dashed line is the theoretical limit for Nc = 4 (i.e. the solid line
translated of log
10
(Nc)), the dashed curve with circles is the experimental results with the FastICA algorithm [38].
From a complexity point of view, the bottleneck is the decomposition in eigenvectors of the covariance matrix
whose size is Nv × Nv. In practical cases, schemes spread the watermark on very long extracted signals. This
prevents the feasibility of the attack, as is.
A first idea, to make the attack work, is to split the extracted vectors into p chunks in order to process smaller
vectors of size Nv
′ = Nv/p. Yet, the problem then is to put them back together because the ambiguity about
the sign and the order completely messes the pieces. The idea shall be given up.
We design an hybrid strategy, mixing this idea of splitting with the MLE algorithm used in the KMA case.
The principle of the attack is resumed in Fig. 4. When the ICA algorithm process one block, it outputs Nc
estimated carrier blocks and the estimated symbols. Taking Nv
′ as the biggest size the ICA algorithm can
manage (this depends on the available computing power), one has a chance to receive reliable hidden symbols.
The pirate can now switch to the KMA context to estimate the whole carriers at a low complexity. Thanks to the
Kerkhoff’s principle, the decoding process is public. The pirate estimates again the symbols with the estimated
carriers. It is likely that this produces a better result than the ICA on small vectors. The iteration of the two
last operations is indeed the transcription to our case of the Expectation Maximization algorithm invented by
Dempster et al [39]. Let us summarize the algorithm:
• Initialization: ICA algorithm. Extract from the extracted vectors chunks of size Nv ′, so that the ICA
algorithm works on pieces. It estimates not only pieces of carriers but also hidden symbols Aˆ(0).
• Iteration: EM algorithm.
– Maximization step. From the estimated symbols Aˆ(k), the MLE algorithm estimates the carriers:
Uˆ(k) = MLE(Y, Aˆ(k)).
– Expectation step. The decoding algorithm gives a new estimation of the hidden symbols: Aˆ(k+1) =
Decoder(Y, Uˆ(k)).
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Figure 4. Final attack for the WOA case.
1.4. Possible hacks
The conclusion of this security analysis stands in the different possibilities to forge pirated content.
• The pirate discloses secret subspace Span (U). He can now focus attack’s noise in this subspace to jam the
communication far more efficiently. He can also nullify the watermarked signals projection in this subspace
to remove the watermark.
• The pirate discloses the secret carriers up to a signed permutation. The above-mentioned hacks are still
possible. Besides, he can detect whether two watermarked pieces of content share the same hidden message.
He can also flip some randomly chosen bits. Moreover, the accidental knowledge of hidden messages in few
watermarked pieces of content might remove this ambiguity. This extra security analysis indeed pertains
the substitutive case studied in subsection I-3.4.
• The pirate discloses the secret carriers. He has a full access to the watermarking channel to read, write or
erase hidden message.
Of course, the quality of the pirated pieces of content depends on the accuracy of his estimation. The authors
focus on this aspect in section 2.
1.5. Extension to spread transform side information watermarking
This subsection presents experiments with side information watermarking using the process of spread spectrum.
In these methods, the symbols aj(`) depend on the host signal in the following way:
aj(`) = f(mj(`),u
T
` xj) (6)
Three techniques were investigated: Improved Spread Spectrum (ISS) [22], Scalar Costa Scheme (SCS) [20], and
Maximized Robustness Embedding (MRE) [21]. Two implementations of SCS have been done. The carriers
have disjoint supports in the first one, which is a possible interpretation of [20]: u1 = (u
T0Tτ . . .0
T
τ )
T , u2 =
(0Tτ u
T . . .0Tτ )
T , and so on with τNc = Nv. The second implementation is called SCS with Subspace Projection
(SSP) [40]: the carriers have a full support and are orthonormal. The embedding distortion, the vector length
and the number of hidden bits are the same for a fair comparison.
The KMA case has not been investigated. The knowledge of the messages does not usually imply the disclosure
of the symbols. In SCS, function f(.) of (6) is private and depends on a secret key (i.e., a dithering vector).
However, information about the symbols may leak from the message. Symbols are Gaussian variables centered
on γ(−1)mj(`) for the ISS technique:
aj(`) = γ(−1)mj(`) − λuT` xj . (7)
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2)−1.
We foresee that the MLE algorithm could easily be tuned to exploit this information leakage.
The KOA is simpler, as the basic assumption is still valid: uT` xj and u
T
k xj (k 6= `) are Gaussian distributed
and non correlated; thus, the symbols are statistically independent. Yet, the efficiency of BSS depends on the
symbols distribution, so that we expect different performances. Once again, in our simulation, the opponent
always uses the same generic ICA algorithm. No fine tuning according to the expected symbols distribution is
done. Fig. (5) shows the results, except for SCS‡. Surprisingly, the rate of the noise estimation variance is in
1/No
2 for DSSS, SSP and MRE. This seems to be due to the bounded support feature of the symbols in these
methods, despite of the use of a generic algorithm. For ISS, the rate is in 1/No. Please, note that, according
to (7), the KOA for ISS is similar to a WOA for the SS method, with a watermark to host power ratio of
γ2/λ2σ2x. A smarter attack on ISS stems from this remark. First, difference vectors are used to disclose the
secret subspace with a PCA. Then, they are corrected in adding the projection of the original vectors scaled by
a factor λ. We are now in a situation similar to a KOA with DSSS. Finally, ICA finishes the job working on
the corrected vectors. The last curve named ‘Corrected ISS’ in Fig. (5) shows the dramatic improvement. The
security level of ISS is in practice as low as the DSSS one.
The WOA is also straightforward as we applied the same ICA algorithm for DSSS, ISS, MRE, and SSP. For
SCS, the observed watermarked vectors are split by chunks of τ samples. Thus, the opponent has No
′ = Noτ
vectors whose length is Nv
′ = Nv/τ , watermarked with Nc
′ = 1 secret carrier. The algorithm is thus a simple
PCA in this case. Fig. (6) shows the results. SCS (or more precisely the way we have implemented it) is obviously
the less secure. But the simple change brought in the implementation of SSP is sufficient to correct this security
flaw §. The other techniques share the same security level. ISS seems to be slightly more secure; however,
remember that we did not tune the contrast function of the ICA algorithm. In the same way, the embedding
parameters (γ, λ) play a big role in the symbols distribution, and the attack might thus perform differently. This
is the reason why we prefer to look at the global shape of the curves, rather than to draw erroneous conclusions
from these meager differences.
2. APPLICATION TO A ROBUST WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE FOR STILL
IMAGES
The goal of this last subsection is to demonstrate the power of ‘smart’ attacks based on secret carriers estimation.
To this end, the section deals with real still images. So far, this article has investigated the first phase of the
attack, the secret disclosure, on synthetic data. The difficulty here is to adapt the algorithms of KMA and
‡For SCS, No = 1 is enough to disclose small length carrier u up to a sign.
§We only analyze here the security of the spreading transform. Yet, the dithering vector in SCS-like technique constitute
a second barrier, which will be the subject of a future work.
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Figure 6. WOA for five different watermarking methods (Nv = 512, Nc = 4, WCR=-15dB). τ = 128 for SCS. For SCS,
SSP and ISS, the embedding parameters are optimal for an expected noise attack whose distortion equals the embedding
distortion: WNR=0 dB.
WOAattack to real images. In a second phase, the opponent uses this a posteriori information to hack pieces of
content, which were watermarked with the same secret key.
2.1. Robust Watermarking
We have chosen a robust watermarking technique [19] embedding Nc = 8 bits in still images of size 512 × 512.
It spreads the watermark signal on Nv = 205008 coefficients in the wavelet domain. Wavelet coefficients xj(i)
are modeled as independent random variables having their own distribution N (0, σ2Xi,j ).
The watermark amplitude factor γj(i) is a complex function of the variance σ
2
Xi,j
, the embedding distortion,
and the targeted attack distortion. This is the result of a double Lagrangian optimization in the framework of
game theory. Roughly, the amplitude factor follows the general law γj(i) = Gjσ
βj
Xi,j
, with Gj and βj optimized
for each image.
2.2. Adaptation to Real Images
We need to adapt the estimators that are based on the too simple model of Sect. 1. However, the selected
technique is too complex and we prefer to simplify the attack and see how robust (in the statistical sense) it
is with respect to more complex model. Therefore, we assume that the watermark amplitude factor is only
proportional to the variance: γj(i) = GjσXi,j . Gj is set for each image in order to fulfill a distortion constraint
expressed by PSNR in dB (set to 38 dB in the experiments).
With this assumption, normalized coefficient y′j(i) = yj(i)/σXi,j is distributed as N (Gjwj(i), 1). The rewrit-
ing of the likelihood of Y ′ shows that y′j must be weighted by Gj/1+G2j . The opponent does not know Gj , but
he estimates it with the variances σˆXi,j . Algorithms are run with these weighted vectors.
2.3. Secret Carriers Estimation
We think that it is more natural for watermarkers to measure the efficiency of the attack by a normalized
correlation of estimations with the secret carriers, rather than by a mean square error power (as the Crame´r-Rao
theorem would recommend). Hence, the criteria is defined as η = tr(UT Uˆ)/Nc. For this purpose, the estimated
carriers are normalized.
Yet, the WOA attack leads to a sign and order ambiguity which must be removed before measuring the
efficiency (we know the secret carriers during the simulations but, of course, a pirate can not do this in real life).
The Hungarian algorithm is run on the matrix |UT Uˆ | (the matrix whose elements are the absolute value of the
elements of UT Uˆ). It finds the permutation Π which maximizes the score η = tr(|UTΠUˆ |)/Nc. Fig. 7 shows the
experimental results.
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Figure 7. Mean normalized correlation η between the estimated carriers and the secret ones as the number of observations
increases. With circles, correlations with Uˆ(0), Uˆ(1), and Uˆ(2) (see EM algorithm in Sect. 1.3). The WOA EM-algorithm
is initialized with the FastICA algorithm [38] on Nv
′ = 2048.
2.4. Hacking Content
Fifty other 512×512 images were watermarked. Two opponents try to pirate them. They succeed if the decoded
message is not equal to the hidden one (even if just one bit is different). Pirate A uses a blind attack (i.e.
pertaining to robustness). For instance, he scales the size of the images by 1/4, compresses with JPEG at quality
factor Q, and he scales them back to the original size. We have also tested a JPEG2000 compression. Pirate
B uses the following smart attack (i.e. pertaining to security). He has estimated the private carriers (KMA or
WOA contexts). For each image, he estimates the hidden message and he tries to flip one bit. The first step is
to find the carrier leading to the lowest correlation in absolute value:
k? = arg
1≤k≤Nc
min |uˆTk y| . (8)
This maximizes the chance of flipping the corresponding bit at the lowest distortion. The second step is the
alteration of the corresponding bit. The attacked vector z is formed as follows:
z(i) = y(i)−Ghack.σXi .sign(uˆTk?y).uˆk?(i) ∀i ∈ {1 . . .Nv} , (9)
and the inversion extraction function concludes the hack.
Three contexts have been tested: KMA with No = 100 image/message pairs (η ∼ 0.3), WOA with No = 1000
images (η ∼ 0.5), and KMA with No = 4500 image/message pairs (η ∼ 0.9). To compare the two strategies, we
measure the probability of success (i.e. the Message Error Rate - MER) against the attack distortion between
original and pirated content. For this purpose, pirate A decreases quality factor Q of the JPEG compression and
pirate B increases parameter Ghack.
Figure 8 clearly shows the power of smart attacks. They need a far smaller distortion budget than the blind
attack (a difference of 15 dB!). In our experiment, pirate A’s images are so damaged that any exploitation is
impossible, as illustrated by Fig. 9. Indeed, we selected in purpose such a robust technique to better illustrate
the danger of information leakages. Moreover, the slope of the MER/distortion characteristics of smart attacks
is very high. It means that pirate B can really trust in his attack, whereas pirate A is never sure he succeeded
until the decoding process happens.
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Figure 9. Comparison between the two pirated Lena images. This is their best quality for a successful attack. Pirate A:
PSNR=21.8 dB, Pirate B: PSNR=35.8 dB.
3. CONCLUSION
As in cryptanalysis, measurement of information leakages is the fundamental principle underlying the theoretical
framework for robust watermarking security assessment presented in this article. A watermarking technique,
even robust, is not secure if the opponent can refine his knowledge on the presumably secret key while pieces of
content are watermarked with the same key. The security level is then defined by the number of observations
the opponent needs in order to accurately estimate the secret key.
The conclusion of this article is not that spread spectrum based watermarking techniques or substitutive
schemes are broken. The goal is to warn the watermarking community that security is a crucial issue. Designers
should not only control the imperceptibility and the robustness of their schemes but also assess their security
levels. Depending on the application designers are targeting (and especially on the observations available to
the pirate), watermarking several pieces of content with the same key might bring threats. This potentially
arises difficulties on the key management. For instance, it is not clear how a blind watermarking decoder will be
informed of the secret key, if this later one is to be changed on a regular basis according to the security levels
assessed in this article.
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